Review of the quarter's economic trends [January 1977] by Carruth, Alan A. et al.
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Bell, David N. F. and Carruth, Alan A. and Danson, Michael W. and 
Duignan, John and Glassford, M. E. and Kirwan, Frank X. and Simpson, 
David R. F. and Wingfield, Alison A. (1977) Review of the quarter's 
economic trends [January 1977]. Quarterly Economic Commentary, 2 (3). 
pp. 1-6. ISSN 0306-7866 , 
This version is available at http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/50222/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any  correspondence  concerning  this  service  should  be  sent  to  Strathprints  administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
THE FRASER OF ALLANDER INSTITUTE 
QUARTERLY ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
January 1977 
The Fraser of Al lander I n s t i t u t e f o r Research on the Scot t ish 
Economy was establ ished in the Un ive rs i t y of Strathclyde on 
1 January 1975, as the r e s u l t of a generous donation from the 
Hugh Fraser Foundation. I t s p r i nc ipa l f unc t ion is to carry 
out research on the Scot t ish economy and i t s research 
programme includes the ana lys is of short - term movements in 
economic a c t i v i t y . The r e s u l t s of t h i s work are published 
each January, A p r i l , Ju ly and October in the I n s t i t u t e ' s 
Quarter ly Economic Commentary. The I n s t i t u t e also publishes 
a ser ies of Research Monographs to provide an o u t l e t f o r 
o r i g i n a l q u a n t i t a t i v e research on the Scot t ish economy, and a 
ser ies of occasional essays on economic po l i c y e n t i t l e d 
Speculative Papers. In co-operat ion wi th the Scot t ish Council 
Research I n s t i t u t e and IBM United Kingdom S c i e n t i f i c Centre 
the I n s t i t u t e i s compi l ing a set of i npu t -ou tpu t tables f o r 
Scot land. The I n s t i t u t e a lso wishes to thank The Scotsman 
Publ ica t ions Limited f o r i t s f i n a n c i a l support i n the 
appointment of a Research Fel low to work on the const ruct ion 
of fo recas t ing models. 
Add i t iona l copies of t h i s Commentary, and of a l l Fraser of Al lander 
I n s t i t u t e pub l i ca t ions may be obtained from the Secretary, The 
Fraser of Al lander I n s t i t u t e , Un i ve rs i t y of S t ra thc lyde , 100 Montrose 
S t ree t , GLASGOW G4 Ol.Z, or through leading booksel lers. 
ISBN 0 904865 11 8 
CONTENTS 
1. Review of the Quarter's Economic Trends 
The World Economy 1 
The United Kingdom Economy 4 
2. The Scottish Economy 
Indicators of Economic Activity 7 
Current Trends 12 
Employment and Unemployment 20 
Outlook for the Future 23 
3. Notes 
Population Drift in Scotland 26 
The Green Pound 29 
4. Summary 32 
5. Special Article 
Scottish Migration: Some Thoughts on 33 
a Human Capital Approach by D N F Bell 
and F X Kirwan 
6. Publications of the Institute 44 
The Commentary for January 1977 was compiled by: 
D N F Bell M E Glassford 
A A Carruth F X Kirwan 
M W Danson D R F Simpson 
J Duignan A A Wingfield 
REVIEW OF THE QUARTER'S ECONOMIC TRENDS 
The World Economy 
There is now ample evidence that the pace of recovery in the major 
economies slackened during 1976. Published statistics, however, 
are as yet inadequate to document the full extent of the slowdown 
or to assert that it was a transient phenomenon. Available 
evidence would suggest that the growth in the major economies in 
1977 may be somewhat slower than had earlier been forecast, and 
that in the short run further reductions in unemployment and 
inflation rates may be very difficult to achieve. Several threads 
may be drawn together in an attempt to justify this interpretation 
of likely future developments. 
A resumption of stockbuilding and an upsurge in consumer demand, 
notably for cars and durables, provided the main impetus for 
recovery from the recession in mid-1975. These stimuli, however, 
were largely pump primers, and the maintenance and strengthening 
of the recovery required that their place be taken by fixed 
investment, and a more broadly based revival in consumer demand. 
This in turn, through the interaction of the international trade 
multiplier should have led to a sustained recovery. The reality 
has been somewhat different. Industrial investment has been slow 
to recover even in those economies which were the first out of 
recession. The reasons for this are not hard to find. Most 
economies appear to have ample excess capacity. In none of the 
major economies does the degree of capacity utilisation approach 
the levels of 1972-73. Unemployment, at best stagnant in most 
economies, testifies to ample available supplies of labour. 
Though profits have recovered cyclically; as wages have grown more 
slowly in line with incomes policies, and as firms have implemented 
price increases and enjoyed rapid productivity growth, the proceeds 
appear to have been used more to reduce corporate indebtedness than 
to increase investment. In part this may be due to the tight 
monetary policies now being implemented in many countries. To a 
certain extent a "crowding-out" effect may be in operation, 
manifesting itself not through a shortage of borrowable funds but 
through the high cost of borrowing. High nominal interest rates 
reduce the attractiveness of any given investment project and 
increase the incentive to reduce indebtedness. The increased 
investment required to sustain the recovery, has in general not 
been forthcoming. Nor has a more diversified pattern of consumer 
demand, save perhaps in the United States. 
The consequences may be seen in industrial production statistics, 
whose course has been erratic during 1976 in the United States, 
Germany and Japan. In the United States, production grew strongly 
throughout the year to August but then appears to have fallen in 
September and October. New orders for industry fell in the third 
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quarter, being most pronounced for durable goods. Unemployment, 
as a percentage of the labour force, whilst lower than in 1975 had 
begun to rise again in the autumn. In Japan, the upward trend in 
industrial production became erratic in the second and third 
quarters, most notably in investment goods. By end summer, 
unemployment had begun to rise again, reflecting the steady fall 
in manufacturing employment during 1976. In Germany the rise in 
unemployment may have levelled off, but the number of unfilled 
vacancies fell steadily during 1976. Investment demand appears 
strong but consumer and external demand appear to be weakening. 
These and other factors have led the OECD to revise downwards its 
forecasts of GNP growth in the major economies in 1977. The table 
below presents OECD estimates for 1976, and forecasts for 1977, of 
changes in GNP and in consumer prices. 
United States 
Japan 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
GNP Growth 
1976 1977 
6.75 4.5 
6 6 
5.5 3.5 
5 3 
4.5 -0.5 
Percentage Changes 
Consumer Prices 
1976 
5 
9.5 
4.75 
9.5 
17 
1977 
5.25 
9.5 
4 
8.75 
20.5 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Dec. 1976. 
These forecasts are made on the basis of unchanged policies in 1977, 
and on the assumption of no rise in oil prices. Since the fore-
casts were finalised in November a number of important indicators 
have moved in a persistently weak direction. This must bear out 
the OECD's own caveat that the forecasts are likely to be in the 
upper range of probable outcomes for most economies other than 
Germany. 
The forecasts set out in the table above mask an expected slowdown 
in the economies of Japan, the United States, and Germany in the 
latter half of this year. In all three cases the inventory cycle 
should have run its course by that time, but only in the United 
States are there indications that private fixed investment will 
adequately support final demand. The outlook is somewhat similar 
for the European economy. A sustained recovery in business 
investment is unlikely in 1977 as levels of unused capacity 
remain historically high and consumer demand depressed. Real 
disposable income is likely to contract further in most of the 
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European economies under the combined influence of fiscal drag and 
anti-inflation policies. The year is unlikely to see a reduction 
in overall levels of unemployment, and this, coupled with the 
downward stickiness of inflation rates may serve to maintain 
savings ratios at high levels, further depressing the level of 
demand. 
It is not yet known whether activity strengthened in the three 
major economies in the fourth quarter of 1976. In making its 
forecasts the OECD assumed that it had. Nor is the exact 
composition of President Carter's fiscal stimulus known. Its 
effects on the world economy will be unlikely, however, to be felt 
much before the second half of this year, and can hardly qualify 
the OECD view that: 
"the worst postwar recession is likely to be followed by the 
slowest postwar recovery, except in 
Foreign Trade Volumes, OECD Area. Annual % Change 
1975 1976* 1977** 
Imports - 6.9 13.5 6.25 
Exports - 4.2 11.0 6.50 
* Provisional 
** Forecast 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook December 1976 
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The UK Economy 
Over the last quarter, three events of major economic significance 
to the UK have occurred: firstly, the government has secured a $3.9 
billion loan from the IMF which will be paid in instalments during 
1977 and 1978: secondly, in order to gain the consent of the IMF 
for this loan, the Chancellor delivered a mid-December mini-budget 
intended to reduce the public sector borrowing requirement by £1.8 
billion in 1977/78 and £2.9 billion in 1978/79: lastly, agreement 
was reached in Basle on a plan to reduce the role of sterling as a 
reserve currency (although it has already been substantially 
reduced, simply by a reduction in foreign holdings of sterling from 
£4 billion at the beginning of 1976 to £2.76 billion by September). 
The scheme provides $3bi11 ion as a 'safety net' to cover withdrawals 
of sterling balances from London. The intention is that such a 
scheme will protect the exhange rate from large fluctuations in 
these balances which do not necessarily reflect the domestic 
circumstances of the British economy. 
The IMF loan is likely sufficiently to restore confidence in foreign 
exchange markets to stabilise the pound for a few months, perhaps 
even until North Sea oil begins to have a significant favourable 
impact on the balance of payments in the second half of 1977. The 
first instalment of the loan, $1.15 billion, has already been paid, 
with $1 billion more to come before the end of 1977. The remainder 
will be payable at the beginning of 1978 - if IMF officials are 
satisfied that the UK has adhered to its commitments to reduce the 
public sector borrowing requirementand to ensure that domestic 
credit expansion is not more than $9 billion in the 12 months to 
April 1977. However, if, as we expect, the UK balance of payments 
current account has moved into surplus by the end of 1977 due to 
the combined effects of the recent devaluation and North Sea oil, 
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there w i l l be no need for a th i rd instalment. 
may be able to avoid a repet i t ion of the close 
i t s pol icies were subjected at the end of 1976. ^.j 
the absence of th is rest ra int may not prove to be unequivocally 
beneficial to the long-term well being of the Br i t i sh economy. 
Thus, the government 
scrutiny to which 
Unfortunately, 
The mini-budget was notable in i t s sharp divergence from the pattern 
of previos post-war budgets. I ts novel feature was the use of the 
public sector borrowing requirement not in the Keynesian sense as 
PUBLIC SEC TOP BORROWING REOO I OO^N7 
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an instrument but rather as an important target of economic policy. 
The principal provisions of the budget were cuts in planned 
government spending which are to total £1 billion in 1977-78 and 
£1.5 billion in 1978-79. On Treasury forecasts these measures 
should cut the PSBR from £10.5 billion in 1977-78 to £8.7 billion 
and from £11.5 billion in 1978-79 to £8.6 billion. A Keynesian 
remedy for Britain's chronically low levels of resource utilization 
would have required some expansion of government spending, rather 
than a contraction - indeed, one effect of the budget will surely 
be to raise unemployment above 1.5 million for some time. However, 
it was apparent that a deflationary policy was required by the IMF 
as a pre-requisite for its loan and that, should this loan not have 
been forthcoming, the effects on unemployment would have been even 
more serious.* The insistence of the IMF on public spending cuts 
* The arguments regarding the 'appropriate' level of government 
spending have been discussed in our last Commentary - see 
J McGilvray, The Debate on Public Expenditure. Fraser of Allander 
Institute Quarterly Economic Commentary, October 1976. 
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was due to a belief that this policy would restrain money supply 
expansion, thus decreasing the rate of inflation and stabilising 
the pound. An alternative rationalisation, that the size of the 
public sector is diverting productive resources from the private 
sector into unproductive activity seems untenable at this time of 
considerable resource underutilization. However, though there may 
be an overall surplus of capacity, new firms and rapidly growing 
firms may be deterred from investment by the high interest rates 
resulting from the government's necessity to fund the public sector 
borrowing requirement. Thus, the high level of public spending 
may be detrimental to dynamic growth in the private sector. 
Having said that, one must recognise that empirical studies, 
conducted when interest and inflation rates were substantially 
lower, have generally shown investment to be unresponsive to changes 
in interest rates. Much more important, it is claimed, are changes 
in income. With a recent improvement in corporate profits an 
upturn in investment in 1977"does seem likely. However, the 
results of the latest DTI survey (taken before the December measures), 
suggest that firms intend to increase investment in 1977 by 
considerably less than the Treasury expected. This confirms the 
findings of the latest CBI survey. 
Consumption expenditure changed little between September and 
November, though seasonal factors and expectations of a VAT 
increase will undoubtedly have boosted the December figures. With 
the reduction in food subsidies, rise in import prices and the 
effectiveness of the social contract in restraining wages there is 
little scope for an expansion of consumption during 1977. The fall 
in real incomes together with restrictions imposed by government 
on credit expansion is likely to severely squeeze personal liquidity 
during 1977. 
As a result, pressure to abandon the social contract and return to 
free collective bargaining will build up over the year. However, 
as with last year's negotiations, the Chancellor may be able to 
offer tax concessions in return for agreement with the TUC. 
Although such an agreement is desirable, its achievementwill depend 
on the ability of the TUC to harmonise the views of craft unions 
seeking a restoration of differentials and those unions with 
substantial numbers of low income members trying to maintain real 
incomes. 
The principal forecasting organisations (Treasury, NIESR and London 
Business School) expect, on average, a GDP growth rate of 1.8% in 
1977 for the UK economy. Most optimistic is the Treasury (2.2%) 
and most pessimistic, the OECD (1.5%). Expansion is expected to 
be concentrated on exports, where the recent downward float of the 
pound will take effect. However, as mentioned in the previous 
section, the general sluggishness of world trade will restrain 
the extent of this expansion. 
